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Abstract
The role of anonymity in giving is examined in a ﬁeld experiment
performed in thirty Dutch churches. For a period of 29 weeks, the
means by which oﬀerings are gathered is determined by chance, pre-
scribing for each oﬀering the use of either ‘closed’ collection bags or
open collection baskets. When using baskets, attendants’ contributions
can be identiﬁed by their direct neighbors, and attendants can observe
the total amount given by the people who preceded them.
Initially, contributions to the services’ second oﬀerings increase by
10% when baskets are used, whereas no eﬀect is found for ﬁrst oﬀerings.
The positive eﬀect of using baskets peters out over the experimental
period. Additional data on the coins collected show that in both oﬀer-
ings, people switch to giving larger coins when baskets are used.
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11 Introduction
How does anonymity aﬀect giving? Recently, this question has been ad-
dressed in some experimental public good games (Andreoni and Petrie, 2002;
Rege and Telle, 2001). These studies ﬁnd that contributions increase when
subjects are unmasked, indicating that – besides economic motivations –
there is a role for social incentives in giving. Subjects act on the circum-
stance that they can see what others give and that their giving decisions
are observed and potentially evaluated by other subjects. Intuition suggests
that the extent to which subjects care about this evaluation by others is
dependent on the social ties that exist between them.
Van Dijk et al. (2002) prove that social ties can indeed form between
subjects participating in public good experiments, which validates the pres-
ence of social ties as a potential explanation for the observed increase in
contributions. However, the ties formed between subjects in the laboratory
are fundamentally diﬀerent from the ties that exist between individuals in
repeated real-life interactions. Consequently, it is not clear to which extent
laboratory ﬁndings on the eﬀect of anonymity on giving decisions can be
extrapolated to real-life situations. Ideally, one would like to observe the
eﬀect of removing anonymity on contribution decisions made by individuals
in their natural habitat.
The ﬁeld experiment reported on in this paper tries to accomplish exactly
this, by implementing a change in the anonymity of giving to oﬀerings in
thirty Baptist churches in the Netherlands. In this particular environment,
one expects social ties to exist between congregation members and moreover,
that these ties are natural and relatively strong and stable. In the churches
considered, it is common to collect oﬀerings at least two times during service
by means of ‘closed’ collection bags that are passed by the attendants. These
bags are closed in the sense that attendants cannot infer the total amount
already given by the attendants who preceded them and the amount given
2by their nearest neighbors.
To examine the role of anonymity, the following treatment is imposed.
For a period of 29 weeks, the collection bags are randomly replaced with open
collection baskets. For each oﬀering, baskets are assigned with probability
0.5 (treatment group), bags are assigned otherwise (control group). By
using baskets, attendants can see both the amount given by their nearest
neighbors as well as the total amount given by the people who preceded
them.
I test the hypothesis that anonymity aﬀects contribution levels by com-
paring the proceeds in the treatment group with the proceeds in the control
group. Using nonparametric tests I ﬁnd the interesting eﬀect that the re-
placement of bags by baskets signiﬁcantly increases contributions to the
second oﬀering, whereas no treatment eﬀect is found for the ﬁrst oﬀering.
This ﬁnding is corroborated by subsequent econometric analysis of the data.
Estimates indicate that the treatment increases proceeds of the second of-
fering by as much as 9.6 percent, although this eﬀect peters out over time.
This diﬀerence in eﬀect is not expected on basis of experimental evidence
on public goods experiments. A possible explanation for this phenomenon
may be that the ﬁrst oﬀering’s proceeds are always earmarked to the parish
itself, whereas the second oﬀerings are mostly gathered for speciﬁc purposes
outside the own parish. For this reason, the ﬁrst oﬀering has mainly a public
good character and the second bears more resemblance to a charity good.
This conjecture is sustained by additional analysis on subsets of the data.
Three churches provided detailed information on the coins that were
collected in each oﬀering. These data show that when baskets are used, the
portion of small coins (up to 20 eurocent) declines as churchgoers shift to
giving larger coins (1 and 2 euro). Though at odds with economic theory,
the result compares to a ﬁnding in Burnham (2003) who reports an upward
shift in modal gift in an experimental dictator game when the anonymity of
3subjects is removed. It further supports the hypothesis that social incentives
like receiving approval from others play an important role in giving and are
triggered by the removal of anonymity.
Van Dijk et al. (2002, p. 277) note that “it is diﬃcult to test the
dynamics of social ties and economic interaction by observing behavior in
actual life.” I believe that the particular setup of this ﬁeld experiment
goes some way in circumventing these problems by using the methodology
of experimental economics to study a real-life economic interaction. The
interaction of passing bags or baskets by churchgoers is well-deﬁned and
takes place periodically in a more or less ﬁxed environment. Which channel
of intermediation – bags or baskets – is used for the interaction is completely
under control of the experimental leader, who determines this by using
a randomized scheme. However, admittedly, some interactions between
parishioners, like for example the interactions that take place between
services, are not controlled.
One disadvantage as compared to laboratory experiments is that ex-
planatory variables other than the means of gathering are liable to change
during the experimental period. Examples are weekly changes in the num-
ber of attendants and their seating pattern (although some regularities are
common), changes in the purpose of the oﬀerings and the minister leading
the service. Fortunately, information on most of the covariates that possibly
inﬂuence oﬀering proceeds is available. I account for them in an econometric
analysis of the data, of which results are given in Section 6. Another draw-
back is that individual contributions cannot be observed because for each
oﬀering only aggregate amounts are reported. This makes it for example
impossible to pin down precisely the number of people that make non-zero
contributions to the oﬀerings.
On the other hand, this ﬁeld experiment in parishes has also some
4advantages relatively to laboratory experiments. First note that church
attendants do not primarily choose to participate in an experiment; they
choose whether or not to go to church. The assumption that no-one alters
this decision due to the introduction of baskets seems reasonable. Second,
attendants have made for years the contribution decision that is under
investigation. As a result, there is no doubt that they understand the
procedure and moreover, pre-experimental data are available for analysis.
A third advantage is that in their contribution decision, church attendants
allocate money they earned in their daily life and not money given to
them as an endowment by the experimenter or received by performing an
artiﬁcial task. Finally, the context of the church is credible in the sense that
attendants will not doubt that their and the other attendants’ contributions
will indeed be used for the speciﬁed objective.1
One caveat should be kept in mind in deriving general policy recom-
mendations for fund-raising institutions from the results presented here.
Parishioners may not be representative for the population of interest to
fund-raisers. Joining church services may correspond to an attitude to giv-
ing that diﬀers from that of the population at large.2 However, it is likely
that the behavior of parishioners is at least suggestive of the response of a
more general population.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives the experimental setup
together with an outline of the institutions that are in force in the partici-
pating churches. Section 3 discusses which social incentives may drive the
eﬀect of the basket-treatment. Furthermore, I review experimental results
1For this reason, the setup is not subject to the critique of Frohlich, Oppenheimer
and Moore (2001). These authors argue that the role of self-interest of individuals in
dictator game experiments is systematically overstated through subjects doubting either
the existence of other subjects or the disposition of the money shared, or because they
view the experiment as a game.
2Eckel and Grossman (2003) report that active membership in religious organizations
is one of the most important determinants of charitable giving. Iannaccone (1998) on the
other hand notes that religion seems to matter but that its impact is far from uniform.
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and the (small) existing literature on giving in churches. Data are presented
in Section 4 and they are analyzed in Section 5 till 7. First, the eﬀect of the
basket-treatment is identiﬁed nonparametrically in Section 5. In Section 6,
a panel data model is estimated to quantify the treatment eﬀect. Section
7 analyzes the eﬀect using baskets on the type of coins given. Section 8
concludes.
2 Experimental design
2.1 Selection procedure
An invitation letter was sent to all 89 Baptist parishes in the Netherlands.
This letter stated in general terms that the University of Groningen intended
to start a research project on church oﬀerings and that participating parishes
could each receive a compensation of
￿300. Parishes should return a reply
form if they were interested to participate in the project.3 The questionnaire
and the instructions that were sent to the local church councils used a neutral
language. In particular, no reference was made to the role of anonymity in
giving.
45 parishes reacted positively; 30 of them were selected for participation,
based on the number of oﬀerings during service and geographical dispersion.4
The selected parishes are geographically dispersed across the country, with
an overrepresentation of parishes in the – rural – northern part of the
country, reﬂecting the fact that a large number of Baptist parishes are
located in this region. The sample is not biased toward particular small
3The amount of
￿300 is not unreasonable, since in order to receive this amount, parishes
not only had to implement the experimental design, but they also had to collect historical
information on the proceeds and purpose of each individual oﬀering held from 1995 onward
and furthermore answer a questionnaire with general questions about the parish and the
parishioners. Examples are questions concerning the demographics of the parishioners and
the number and type of seats in the church building.
4For example, one parish dropped out because it did not have oﬀerings, another because
it only had one oﬀering per service.
6or large parishes.
Most of the selected parishes have two oﬀerings per service. Commonly,
collection bags like the one depicted in ﬁgure 1a are used to gather the
proceeds.5 Two parishes have standard an exit oﬀering, and one parish only
rarely has a second oﬀering.6 Celebration of the Lord’s supper – which in
most parishes takes place monthly – results in an additional (third) oﬀering
during service in 21 parishes.7 At the Sunday of Easter and Pentecost,
3 respectively 2 churches have only one oﬀering with a special purpose.
The proceeds of these so-called ‘gratitude oﬀerings’ are as a rule far above
average.
In each selected parish, an individual (in most instances the treasurer)
was appointed to coordinate the research project. Besides ﬁlling out the
questionnaire and gathering historical data, his or her task during the exper-
imental period was to act as experimental leader, looking after the correct
implementation of the setup. He instructed the deacons by which means
(bags or baskets) they had to gather the oﬀerings and he made sure that in
each service the number of attendants was counted. After service, he ﬁlled
out a form with questions regarding the particularities of the service and
the oﬀerings.
Baptists form a relatively small denomination in the Netherlands. With
the ﬁrst parishes already being founded around 1840, they now form an
integral part of Dutch society.8 All parishes have service on Sunday morning
during which one or more oﬀerings take place. The parishes considered
5An exception is formed by the extra oﬀering gathered after having celebrated the
Lord’s supper, which is sometimes gathered by means of a plate (10 churches) or a mug
(one church).
6This was only noticed after the beginning of the experimental period.
720 churches celebrated the Lord’s supper after the regular service and of these
churches, 15 gave the possibility to leave the service in between. 2 celebrated the Lord’s
supper in an additional evening service.
8The parishes should be distinguished from the younger denomination of so-called Free
Baptists.
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Figure 1: Collection bags and baskets used.
are aﬃliated to the national Baptist federation, but have a large degree of
autonomy in organizing their services. Due to this, changes in aspects of the
service like the introduction of baskets to gather oﬀerings are more easily
implemented than e.g. would have been the case in e.g. the Dutch Reformed
or Catholic churches in the Netherlands, which are more hierarchically
organized.
2.2 Treatment
During the experimental period, the treatment imposed is that for some
oﬀerings the familiar collection bags are replaced by open collection baskets
(see ﬁgure 1). This treatment provides attendants with two additional
pieces of information. First, nearest neighbors can observe each other’s
contributions and second, attendants can see the total amount given by the
people who preceded him or her.
Before the start of the experiment, the appointed person in each church
received a randomized scheme indicating for each oﬀering by which means
it had to be gathered. These schemes were constructed as follows. For
each oﬀering, the Gauss random number generator drew from a U[0,1]
distribution; values larger than 0.5 resulted in the oﬀering receiving the
treatment. Note that in this way, it can happen that none, one or both
oﬀerings in one service are collected by means of a basket.
8Most churches informed their members in advance that oﬀerings could be
taken in by either bags or baskets. In some parishes this was communicated
during a service or other meeting, and in other parishes a message appeared
in the church periodical.9 The necessary baskets were sent to the churches.
Two churches used baskets of their own that were similar to the ones
supplied.
2.3 Order of moves
At the beginning of service, one of the deacons announces to the congre-
gation the number and the purpose of the oﬀerings that will be held. Just
before the actual gathering, the minister makes an second announcement
that an oﬀering will take place.
One of more deacons pick up a collection bag from the table in front of
the church, which is then passed in the following way: Each deacon gives
his bag to a visitor; (s)he makes his or her contribution and passes the bag
to the person next to him or her. This procedure is repeated until the last
person in the row has made his contribution. The bag is then passed to the
next row, either directly by the last person or indirectly by intervention of
the deacon waiting in the aisle. The oﬀering ends when all attendants have
had the opportunity to make a donation.10 A typical scheme is depicted
in ﬁgure 2. In most churches (26), the second oﬀering directly follows the
ﬁrst, that is, the deacon hands out the ﬁrst collection bag, waits until the
churchgoer has passed the bag and then hands out the second collection bag
to the same churchgoer.
9In the vast majority of the parishes, visitors did not know in advance for which
particular oﬀerings replacement took place. In six churches, visitors were told at the
beginning of service whether bags or baskets were used for the oﬀerings in that service.
10During the gathering, the organ plays and possibly the congregation sings a song.
9Figure 2: An exemplary oﬀering gathering scheme.
2.4 Oﬀering purposes
The purpose of the ﬁrst oﬀering in each church is the parish itself; the
purpose of the second oﬀering changes weekly and varies from parish to
parish. These purposes of the second oﬀering can be divided into four
categories. The ﬁrst category comprises all oﬀerings serving a speciﬁc
purpose within the own parish. Examples are oﬀerings for church building or
renovation; oﬀerings for bearing costs of sending ﬂowers to elderly members;
for evangelical work or for buying a new organ. The second category consists
of oﬀerings the purpose of which is to fund (one of) the tasks of the national
Baptist federation. The third category includes purposes that have an
indirect link to the own parish, like partner communities in Eastern Europe
or missionaries sent out to developing countries. The last category consists
of all purposes outside the sphere of inﬂuence of the own parish, like for
example oﬀerings for Amnesty International or the Leprosy Fund.
Thus giving to the ﬁrst oﬀering has mainly a public good character,
whereas giving to the second oﬀering either has a public good character (in
case of an internal purpose) or more the character of a charity good (in case
10of an external purpose).11
The oﬀerings represent on average 10 to 25% of total revenues of a parish
which further comprise regular bank payments by the members, bequests
and rents.12
3 The role of anonymity in giving
3.1 Social incentives
Which incentives might induce individuals to contribute more in a non-
anonymous context? I brieﬂy discuss a number of incentives relevant for
making contribution decisions to public goods or charity and sketch their
implications for the expected eﬀect of the introduction of baskets. Notwith-
standing the sequential character of the oﬀerings, I will focus on non-strategic,
social incentives. By social incentive I refer to an emotion or motive that is
aﬀected by (changes in) the social context of an individual decision maker.
In order to make things more precise, I will deﬁne two kinds of social contexts
and subsequently classify social incentives on basis of the minimial context
they need to be triggered:
Social context with limited information: Each individual has informa-
tion on his own contribution and knows how his contribution aﬀects
the payoﬀ to others.
Social context with full information: In addition to the knowledge he
has in the context with limited information, each individual knows
11Notice that in case an individual derives utility from the total amount his/her church
donates to the external purpose, his utility is positively aﬀected by the amount donated
by others, as in a public good situation.
12In some parishes it also happens that a small minority of members makes (for reasons
of tax deduction) regular payments by bank explicitly labelled ‘oﬀering contribution’
instead of contributing to the oﬀerings during service. This lowers the observed average
contribution per attendant. This does not aﬀect the non-parametric eﬀects which I will
carry out at level of individual parishes; in the econometric estimation, the eﬀect is
absorbed by the church-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect. The same is true for the possible endogeneity
of the church selection decision.
11that (some) other individuals are able to evaluate his decision and
that he can evaluate the decisions of others.
Stated in this terminology, the basket-treatment signiﬁes a move from
the limited information context to the full information context. Examples
of social incentives that possibly aﬀect behavior in a limited information
context are pure altruism and warm glow. A pure altruist not only cares
about the payoﬀ to himself but is also concerned about the beneﬁt accruing
to other individuals, without deriving utility from his private gift per se.13
A person induced by feelings of warm glow derives utility from the mere act
of giving. Altruism (Andreoni, 1995; Goeree, Holt and Laury, 2002) and
warm glow (Palfrey and Prisbey, 1997) have empirically been identiﬁed as
important incentives to contribute in public good experiments.
Is the contribution of church attendants who are motivated by altruism
and warm glow aﬀected by the move from a limited information toward
a full information social context? Since most church periodicals provide
information on average contributions to the oﬀerings, the extra information
on individual contributions as provided by the baskets does not aﬀect
the decision of an altruist who only cares about the average beneﬁts to
others. The decisions of attendants motivated by warm glow are also
unaﬀected by the basket-treatment, since this incentive is a function of the
own contribution only.
Examples of social incentives that can come into play under a full
information social context are prestige (Harbaugh, 1998a,b),14 receiving
social approval, avoiding shame, social comparison and fairness. In order
to receive prestige, identiﬁcation of your contribution by others clearly is a
necessary prerequisite. Individuals who care about receiving social approval
– or the opposite, avoiding shame – are not concerned about whether other
13Andreoni (1990).
14Harbaugh deﬁnes prestige as the utility that comes from having the amount of a
donation publicly known.
12people know how much they contribute but rather how other people evaluate
their contribution. Elster (1999, p. 149) describes shame as “triggered by
the contemptuous or disgusted disapproval by others of something one has
done. It is an internal interaction-based emotion: I feel shame in your
presence because I know you disapprove of me.”15 Individuals who care
about how their contribution compares to the contributions of others are
led by motivations of social comparison; fairness considerations inﬂuence the
decision-making process if individuals value how their contribution relates
to some “fair” standard, which itself is some function of the contributions
of others.16 Masclet et al. (2003) ﬁnd that the opportunity for agents
to express disapproval of others decisions increases contribution levels and,
moreover, that the eﬀect of these nonmonetary sanctions is greater under
partner than under stranger matching. In our context, parishioners can be
viewed as partners since individual parishioners have made a positive choice
for their own parish and, as a corollary, for the people they meet regularly
in church to share their faith and the parish’s resources with.17
In the churches, prestige might lead to higher contributions when bas-
kets are used, since only baskets provide the necessary identiﬁcation of an
individual’s contribution by others.18 Churchgoers searching for social ap-
proval may seize the opportunity given by the baskets to show that they “do
their part”19 and increase their contribution. They might however be wary
to overdo it for reasons of fairness and social comparison, since deviating
15Bowles and Gintis (2003) develop an analytical model which shows that shame can
increase the level of cooperation in a group.
16See e.g. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Fehr and G¨ achter
(2000) for models and experiments on fairness. Andreoni, Brown and Vesterlund (2002)
look at fairness considerations in a two-person sequential public good game.
17The number of members of the churches in the sample varies from 26 to 384, with the
median at 130. In general, an individual member is personally acquainted with a large
fraction of the other members.
18This is not fully true. Individuals could in fact choose to voluntarily show their
contribution to their neighbors before dropping it into the bag. However, it does not seem
likely that this plays an important role in practice.
19Andreoni and Petrie (2002).
13too much from an implicitly agreed upon ‘standard’ amount may trigger
negative reactions. In this way the identiﬁcation provided by the baskets
may increase average contributions when social approval and shame are
important motives, but may simultaneously decrease variation in individual
contributions when attendants care how their contribution compares to the
contribution of others. Intuitively, one expects the use of baskets to have a
larger impact on the proceeds of the second oﬀering if individuals care about
approval, since the more altruistic character of this oﬀering gives individuals
greater opportunity to show their generosity.
3.2 Experimental and ﬁeld studies
The issue how identiﬁcation of subjects aﬀects giving has recently been in-
vestigated in experimental public good games (Andreoni and Petrie, forth-
coming; Rege and Telle, 2001; G¨ achter and Fehr, 1999). The main ﬁnding in
these papers is that removing anonymity leads to increased contributions.
G¨ achter and Fehr (1999) observe that the desire for social approval is ir-
relevant for behavior when the subjects are complete strangers, but when
“the opportunity for social exchange is combined with some minimal social
familiarity there is a substantial increase in contribution levels.” (p. 352).
Hoﬀman, McCabe and Smith (1996) ﬁnd in a study on dictator games that
oﬀers are lowered as the social distance between the experimental experi-
mental subjects and the experimental leader increases.
Two diﬀerences between these public good experiments and the current
setup have to be mentioned. First, in the studies mentioned, identiﬁcation
in the non-anonymity condition is global, in the sense that a subject’s contri-
bution is revealed to all other participants. The current study only provides
local identiﬁcation because identiﬁcation of an individual’s contribution is
restricted to his or her nearest neighbors. Second, the order of moves in the
basket oﬀerings is inherently sequential instead of simultaneous. Sequential
14play may help to sustain cooperation when a when a substantial fraction of
the subjects are conditional cooperators (Houser and Kurzban, 2003).20
Further evidence for the role that information on others’ contributions
and identiﬁcation of contributors plays in giving behavior is provided by ﬁeld
studies. Field data on fund raising show the eﬀect of category reporting
(Harbaugh, 1998a, b) and the eﬀect of publicly announcing amounts of
‘seed money’ (List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002). The former points out that a
prestige motive may aﬀect an individual’s contribution decision; the latter
study provides evidence that individuals take the amount already given by
others into account in making their own contribution decision. Finally, Haan
and Kooreman (2002) analyze data on honor systems for the sale of candy
bars within ﬁrms. Their evidence suggests that in settings where subjects
are free to choose their contribution, they may experience a strong moral
obligation to pay the price asked.
3.3 Literature on giving in churches
The number of studies dealing with giving in churches are relatively few.
Most of the existing studies focus on group-size eﬀects by looking at per-
member rates of annual giving. Sullivan (1985), Stonebraker (1993) and
Zaleski and Zech (1994) all report a negative relationship between the
number of members and per-member rates of annual giving.21 Y e ti ti s
hard to interpret these results as evidence that free riding increases in group
size.22 Zaleski and Zech (1996) for example put forward that for small
parishes, members may agree to collectively share congregation costs. Since
these costs do not increase proportionately with membership, an increase in
membership leads to a drop in per capita giving. Iannaccone (1998) argues
20Vesterlund (2003) provides a theoretical model on sequential fundraising showing that
announcement of contributions can be optimal when there is imperfect information about
the value of the good.
21Reported in Iannaccone (1998).
22Lipford (1995) found no evidence of a group size eﬀect on giving, but was criticized
by Zaleski and Zech (1996) for using a ﬂawed speciﬁcation.
15that congregation size may be endogenous. Church members may also feel
that the services their church oﬀers are of lower quality as the number of
members increases. Finally, Tullock (1996) argues that in giving, members
“make a bargain with God” by buying a special type of ﬁre insurance, and
that public good considerations are for this reason minor in giving decisions
of congregation members.
A notable diﬀerence between the present study with previous studies
is that the data I examine are weekly contributions to oﬀerings by church
attendants instead of annual contributions by church members.T h i s g i v e s
the opportunity to use intra-church variation in the number of attendants
to assess a possible group size eﬀect. In addition, I get rid of a host of
confounding factors like e.g. the above mentioned cost sharing argument.
4D a t a
The experimental period lasted for 29 Sundays, in the time period from
March 3, to September 15, 2002. In one parish, the experiment ran till
September 22 and in another till September 29, since in these parishes a few
services were cancelled. One parish left the sample after three weeks23 and
was replaced by another in which the experimental period started at May 5
and ended at November 17.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
For the ﬁrst oﬀering 834 observations are available and for the second
791. Tables 1 contains summary statistics on the ﬁrst and second oﬀering.
The table shows that per-attendant proceeds are on average 23% higher for
the ﬁrst oﬀering and that the distribution is skewed to the right for the ﬁrst
as well as the second oﬀering. The mean values of the dummy variables
show that — as a result of the randomization — about half of the ﬁrst as
23This parish ceased participation because the treasurer of this parish had to quit his
job on personal grounds and could not ﬁnd a successor.
16well as the second oﬀerings is gathered by means of bags, and the other
half by means of baskets. The table further shows that in about 20% of the
services an additional third oﬀering is held (“is 3rd”); and in about 12% of
the services an exit oﬀering (“is exit”), which in half of the cases is meant
for missionary work. These variables are included in the empirical analysis
to account for the possible eﬀect of additional oﬀerings on the proceeds of
the ﬁrst two oﬀerings. Exit oﬀerings meant for missionary work are taken
up separately, since they are often announced one week in advance.
The dummy “simultaneous” indicates whether the ﬁrst oﬀering is di-
rectly followed by the second, which is true in about 81% of the services. Si-
multaneity means here that there is no time lag between the two contribution
decisions. This may aﬀect the amount given in each of the two oﬀerings.24
A few oﬀerings receive a special recommendation or have a relationship with
the character of the service. Since recommendations are directly aimed at
increasing the proceeds of an oﬀering and a relation between the sermon
and the oﬀering purpose increases the attendants awareness of the oﬀering,
both are included in the empirical analysis.
The dummy “music” equals one if additional musicians are present in
the service. “Own minister” is a dummy that equals one if the own minister
leads the service and the dummy “coﬀee” indicates if attendants have the
possibility to drink coﬀee – for free – after service. The music and coﬀee
dummy will be included to pick up a possible “good mood” eﬀect of hearing
music and having the prospect of coﬀee. One’s mood may also be aﬀected
by the amount of sunshine on a given day. “Sun” gives the daily hours of
sunshine as a percentage of the maximum amount of possible sunshine one
could obtain.25 The “own minister” dummy is included to pick up possible
24In non-simultaneous oﬀerings, the ﬁrst oﬀering commonly takes place before the
preaching and the second after the preaching.
25This maximum amount increases as days get longer. To take into account the
geographical dispersion of the parishes, information was gathered from ﬁve diﬀerent
weather stations in the Netherlands.
17eﬀects of the preacher on the perceived quality of the service, resulting in
more or less generosity. The “special services” dummy equals one if the
service has a special character, like e.g. baptizing services and services in
which a new minister is installed. These services are characterized by a
relatively large number of guests. The dummy for family services takes
on the value one if a service has the character of a low-threshold family
service. Due to this character, these services are attended by an above
average number of children, which is likely to have a downward eﬀect on
average per-attendant contributions. The “evening service” dummy equals
one if on the same Sunday a service is held in the evening hours. The
opportunity to visit an evening service is seized by some parishioners –
especially youth – to opt out for the morning service, with the eﬀect that
having an evening service may change the composition of the parishioners
present in the morning service.
The dummy “Chr. celebration” equals one if the service is held on
Christian celebration days like Easter and Pentecost. Besides aﬀecting the
number of people who go to church, attendants consider these days as special
days which may inﬂuence their contribution decisions. So-called gratitude
oﬀerings are collected at special days like Easter and Pentecost to give
attendants the opportunity to express their gratitude. The purpose of these
oﬀerings can be internal as well as external. In general, the contributions to
these oﬀerings are far above average. Oﬀerings held following the celebration
of the Lord’s Supper are also possibly used by attendants to express their
gratitude. For these reasons, a “gratitude” and a “Lord’s Supper” dummy
are included in the empirical analysis. A complete list on the dummy
variables deﬁned is given by table A.1.
With regard to the oﬀering purposes, the table makes clear that almost
all (99.4%) of the ﬁrst oﬀerings have the own parish as purpose; of the second
oﬀerings, 30% serves speciﬁc internal purposes, 56% the Baptist federation
18and 7% other purposes outside the own parish.
Figure 3 shows the per-week development of per-attendant contribution
to the ﬁrst and second oﬀering averaged over all parishes during the ex-
perimental period. Gratitude oﬀerings and oﬀerings held after celebration
of the Lord’s Supper are dropped from the sample because of their special
character. The ﬁgure shows that the average contribution to the ﬁrst oﬀering
is clearly higher than to the second. The two exceptions are week 12 and
14, of which week 12 coincides with Pentecost for the vast majority of the
parishes.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Table 2 presents the average per-attendant contributions to the ﬁrst
and second oﬀerings for all parishes in the sample. Moreover, a distinction
is made in oﬀerings gathered by means of bags and oﬀerings gathered by
means of baskets. Large diﬀerences in average contributions are observed
between diﬀerent parishes. The last column gives the diﬀerence in average
proceeds between open and closed oﬀerings.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
5 Removing anonymity: nonparametric tests
To assess the eﬀect of using baskets on average oﬀering proceeds, I ﬁrst
calculate Wilcoxon rank sum statistics. I distinguish between the eﬀect on
ﬁrst and on second oﬀerings. The null hypothesis of no treatment eﬀect
is rejected for the second oﬀering but not for the ﬁrst oﬀering.26 Figure
26The p-values are 0.000014 and 0.1800, respectively, and are calculated as follows: For
each parish separately, consider all ﬁrst oﬀerings and denote the total number of times a
bag is used by m, the number of times a basket is used by n and the sum of the ranks of
the basket observations by Rn. Since the total number of n+m observations per oﬀering
per parish exceeds 10 in all cases, the asymptotic normality of Rn c a nb eu s e ds u c ht h a t
p(Rn ≤ k) ≡ Φ

k+1/2−n(m+n+1)/2 √
mn(m+n+1)/12

under the null hypothesis of no treatment eﬀect. p-values for the general eﬀect are obtained
194 shows a frequency plot of the calculated standard normal z-values (one
value for each parish). At the level of individual parishes, large diﬀerences
are observed. For the second oﬀering, all signiﬁcant diﬀerences (8 parishes
on a 5% level) point to a positive eﬀect from the introduction of baskets on
average proceeds. For the ﬁrst oﬀering, signiﬁcantly more is raised by the
basket oﬀerings in three parishes but in one parish the baskets have a strong
negative eﬀect on average proceeds.
INSERT FIGURES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE
I also calculated for each parish t-statistics for the diﬀerence in average
contributions between open and closed oﬀerings for the ﬁrst and the second
oﬀering separately.27 Results are shown in ﬁgure 5. The patterns found are
roughly similar to those found by using the Wilcoxon rank sum test, except
for parish nr. 5 in table 2. For this parish, the eﬀect of treatment is found
to be strongly negative when estimated by the diﬀerence in mean test.
Both the Wilcoxon rank sum test and the diﬀerence in mean test assume
that the observations are independent. One could object that in practice
there might be a dependence between oﬀerings held in the same parish,
because from week to week more or less the same people visit service and,
moreover, these regular visitors tend to take the same seats. The Wilcoxon
signed rank test is an alternative that does not assume independence. The
test uses for each parish the observed paired percentage diﬀerence of average
basket oﬀering proceeds and average bag oﬀering proceeds. According to this
test (two-sided), the p-values of no treatment eﬀect are 0.2096 and 0.0727
for the ﬁrst and second oﬀering, respectively.
by summation of the Rn values over all parishes. The procedure is the same for the second
oﬀerings.
27For each parish, the t-statistics were calculated as tj =
yj,basket−yj,bag
Sp
√
1
n+ 1
m
with Sp =
(n−1)S2
n+(m−1)S2
m
n+m−2 and j =1 ,2 denoting whether the oﬀerings are ﬁrst or second oﬀerings,
and yj,bag (yj,basket) per-attendant proceeds averaged over all jths oﬀerings gathered by
means of bags (baskets) during the experimental period.
20Data on the number and type of coins and bank notes show that in parish
nr. 5, once a month a note of
￿100 is contributed.28 Each time, the note is
contributed to an oﬀering which is gathered by means of a bag and whose
purpose is the parish itself. Since the note increases the total proceeds with
about 200%, the phenomenon leads to a number of outliers for which the
diﬀerence in mean test is more sensitive than the Wilcoxon rank sum test.29
This behavior of contributing large bank notes only to bag-oﬀerings indicates
that a certain wariness to deviate too much from an accepted ‘standard’ may
aﬀect contribution decisions. When one’s contribution is much higher than
those of others, one might opt for anonymity since the concern for possible
negative reactions (‘What a show-oﬀ.’) outweighs the concern for prestige.
6 Econometric analysis
The ﬁeld character of the experiment entails that one has to account for
a number of covariates other than the treatment variable that potentially
inﬂuence the oﬀering proceeds and that vary both between services (e.g.
the number of attendants) and within services. Variables that vary within
services are variables that are oﬀering speciﬁc. Examples of such variables
are the purpose of the oﬀering and the way in which the oﬀering was recom-
mended to the congregation. In order to assess the eﬀects of identiﬁcation
while accounting for these covariates, the following panel regression is esti-
mated
lnyit,j = αi,j + βjBASKETit,j + β3BASKETit,1 · Dit,j
+
4
k=1(ζk + φk,jBASKETit,j) · Tk(t)+δj lnqit,j
+ θ xit,j +( ψ 
1(1 − Dit,j)+ψ 
2Dit,j) · zit,j +  it,j,
(1)
where the logarithm of the average per-attendant contribution yit,j to the
jth oﬀering in week t of the experimental period in parish i is the dependent
28This parish is by coincidence on of the three parishes for which this information is
available.
29Pre-experimental data from this parish show that the act of giving a
￿100-note once a
month already started in the year 2000 and is not a reaction to the introduction of baskets
as a means to gather oﬀerings.
21variable; i ∈{ 1,...,30}; j ∈{ 1,2}; t ∈{ 1,...,29}.
The coeﬃcients αi,j absorb church speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Moreover, by
adding a subscript j, I allow the eﬀect of church speciﬁc variables to diﬀer
between the ﬁrst and second oﬀering. BASKETit,j is a dummy variable
indicating whether baskets were used to gather the oﬀering. The parameters
β1 and β2 thus measure the eﬀect of switching from bags to baskets in
terms of percentage change in average proceeds of the ﬁrst and second
oﬀering, respectively. The dummy variable Dit,j takes on the value 1 if
the observation under consideration is a second oﬀering and 0 otherwise, so
Dit,j =1i ﬀ .j =2 .A sar e s u l tβ3 estimates the eﬀect of using a basket in
the ﬁrst oﬀering on the proceeds on the second oﬀering.30
The functions Tk(t) represent non-overlapping time-intervals deﬁned as
Tk(t)=I[6k<t≤ 6(k +1 ) ] ,k =1 ,...,4, with I[·] an indicator function.
The coeﬃcients ζi pick up possible eﬀects of inﬂation or changes in the
income of parishioners during the experimental period. The products of
these time intervals with the basket dummy are added to incorporate changes
in the treatment eﬀect over time, where again a distinction is made in
the ﬁrst and second oﬀering. The number of attendants is given by qit,j
such that 1 − δj reﬂects the percentage increase in total proceeds by a
one percent increase in the number of attendants. xit,j is a vector of
service speciﬁc variables (is 2nd, is 3rd, is exit, mission exit, simultaneous,
music, coﬀee, family service, special service, sun). The variables in zit,j
are allowed to have a diﬀerent impact on the ﬁrst and second oﬀering, as
measured by ψ1 and ψ2, respectively,31 and contains variables that are
oﬀering speciﬁc (recommendation, relation, federation, external, Eastern
30Since in some of the parishes attendants know in advance how the second oﬀering will
be collected, one might argue that also a parameter measuring the eﬀect of using a basket
in the second oﬀering on the proceeds of the ﬁrst oﬀering should be added. However, since
it turns out that β3 is insigniﬁcant across speciﬁcations, the same is likely to be true for
the reverse eﬀect.
31A speciﬁcation test did not ﬁnd such a diﬀerence in eﬀect for the variables xit,j.
22Europe, gratitude)32 or that might for some reason have a diﬀerent eﬀect on
the ﬁrst (internal) than on the second oﬀering (own minister, evening service
and Chr. celebration). For “own minister” this reason is that the minister
receives his salary from the parishes’ internal funds. The possibility of an
evening service might lead to a selection eﬀect. Since 63% of the evening
services have only one oﬀering (usually for the parish itself), parishioners
who normally visit the evening service may have another attitude to the
second than to the ﬁrst oﬀering. Christian celebrations might have a larger
eﬀect on second oﬀerings that are held after the preaching.
Since the presence of generous people in a service will be beneﬁcial
to both the ﬁrst and the second oﬀering, observations on the ﬁrst and
second oﬀering in a service are likely to be correlated. Another reason for
a correlation between these oﬀerings is that attendants may determine in
advance the sum of money they bring with them to church, only deciding
how to split this sum between oﬀerings during service, thereby inducing
a negative correlation. Since the dependent variable is (logarithm of) the
average contribution per attendant, the errors terms are heteroscedastic,
with variance decreasing in the number of attendants. To allow both
for correlation and heteroskedasticity, the error structure is modeled as
follows: var( it,j)=σjj/qit; cov( it,1,  it,2)=σ12/qit and cov( it,j,  vw,k)=0
whenever v  = i or t  = w, j,k ∈{ 1,2}.
6.1 Estimates
The results are based on 791 services with at least two oﬀerings, leading to a
total of 1582 included observations.33 Estimates for diﬀerent versions of the
model are given in table 3. The ﬁrst column contains least squares estimation
results for the model without a time trend for the treatment and neglecting
32Internal purposes act as reference category.
33Contrary to the analysis in Section 5, gratitude oﬀerings and oﬀerings following
celebration of the Lord’s Supper are included in the sample.
23heteroscedasticity in the error terms. Column (2) gives the results of a basic
regression with heteroskedasticity taken into account. In this regression, the
only explanatory variables added besides the basket dummy are dummies for
the oﬀering purposes and a service speciﬁc group size eﬀect. In column (3),
the same model as in (1) is estimated but now with heteroscedasticity taken
into account. The complete model is estimated in column (4), addressing
heteroscedasticity and incorporating a linear time trend.
The four speciﬁcations provide no evidence of a treatment eﬀect on the
average proceeds of the ﬁrst oﬀering, but they do show a highly signiﬁcant
increase in those of the second. These ﬁndings are in line with the pat-
tern revealed by the nonparametric tests in the previous section. For the
complete model, the initial increase in proceeds of the second oﬀering by
the introduction is estimated at 9.6%. This increase is smaller as in An-
dreoni and Petrie (2002), who ﬁnd an initial increase of about 35%. Among
other things, one reason for this diﬀerence might be in the current setup,
identiﬁcation is local instead of global.
For the second oﬀering, the number of periods since the start of the
experimental period has a signiﬁcant (p-value = 0.018) and sizeable negative
eﬀect on the treatment eﬀect: The eﬀect of using baskets for the second
oﬀering peters out over time. It is unclear what causes the particular
large drop in weeks 19 till 24, perhaps it has something to do with the
holiday season, during which a sizable fraction of the regular attendants is
elsewhere. It is tempting to relate the diminishing eﬀect in time to public
good experiments studying the free rider hypothesis. (See e.g. Marwell and
Ames, 1979, 1980, 1981.) A major ﬁnding in this these type of experiments
is that contributions decline with repetition (e.g. Isaac, McCue and Plott,
1985). This relation however is somewhat problematic since there is no ﬁnal
round in the current setup (oﬀerings were still held after the experimental
period ended) nor can the second oﬀering be considered as a pure public
24good. The Haan and Kooreman (2002) study also lacks a clearly deﬁned
ﬁnal round; they ﬁnd a similar negative time-eﬀect. In general, contributions
increase over time. The estimates imply an annual increase in oﬀering
proceeds of about 8.4%.
The means of gathering of the ﬁrst oﬀering does not seem to have an
eﬀect on the proceeds of the second oﬀering. The overall eﬀect of using
baskets given in table 3 (calculated by summing ˆ β1, ˆ β2 and ˆ β3), denotes
the change in average proceeds when all bags are replaced by baskets; this
eﬀect is signiﬁcantly positive at the 5-percent level. The hypothesis that the
eﬀect of using baskets is the same for the ﬁrst and second oﬀering is clearly
rejected.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Looking at the other explanatory variables, one sees a negative group
size eﬀect as measured by the δj’s: a 1 percent increase in the number of
attendants leads for both oﬀerings only to a 0.7 percent (≈ 1 − 0.268 and
≈ 1 − 0.312 respectively) increase in total proceeds. This is consonant with
earlier empirical studies on giving in churches. A possible explanation is
that on Sundays with relatively few attendants, the people who come are the
most dedicated and most generous ones. The presence of an additional third
oﬀering leads to a reduction in average proceeds of the ﬁrst two oﬀerings
of 8%, but no such eﬀect occurs for additional exit oﬀerings. Average
contributions are lower when the service is a family service, which may be
caused by the presence of a large number of small children in these services
who give less on average. As expected, people give more when a service is
held at Easter or Pentecost. The own minister leading the service does not
aﬀect contributions.
Interestingly, recommending the oﬀering increases contributions to the
second oﬀering by 24% but has no eﬀect on the proceeds of the ﬁrst oﬀering.
25The same goes for the oﬀering purpose being related with the preaching.
This shows that parishioners are sensitive to recommendations. Partly this
may be caused because an appeal is made to their social obligation to con-
tribute. Gratitude oﬀerings bring in 116% more if held as ﬁrst oﬀering and
61% more if held as second oﬀering. Having an evening service on the same
day does not aﬀect average contributions to the ﬁrst oﬀering, but increases
the average proceeds of the second oﬀering by 10%. One explanation for
this is a possible negative correlation between being inclined to attend the
evening instead of the morning service and the willingness to contribute to
the second oﬀering. This explanation is sustained by the fact that most
evening services have only one oﬀering. Finally, proceeds of the second
oﬀering are much higher (+37%) when the purpose is in Eastern Europe;
higher when the purpose is an external one (+8%) and slightly lower when
the oﬀering serves the national federation (−4%).
How are the results in this and the previous section related to the
experimental evidence on anonymity in giving and what do they tell us
about the importance of social incentives? The positive treatment eﬀect
found for the second oﬀering is in accordance with the positive eﬀect of
removing anonymity found by both Andreoni and Petrie (2002) and Rege
and Telle (2001). Contrary to these however is the absence of an eﬀect of
treatment for the ﬁrst oﬀering. A possible explanation for this may be found
in the fact that the ﬁrst oﬀering is always meant for the parish self. Most
churchgoers make – in addition to the amounts given to the oﬀering – regular
bank payments to the parish. Since these amounts are not observed by
the other parishioners, one can always defend low contributions to the ﬁrst
oﬀerings by claiming that one compensates for this by making large bank
payments. Having an excuse might prevent people from feeling ashamed.
Another potential explanation for the diﬀerence in eﬀect for the ﬁrst and
26second oﬀering is that, due to the fact that the second oﬀering often serves an
external purpose, it gives more possibilities to exhibit unselﬁsh behavior. A
third explanation uses the fact that the purpose of the ﬁrst oﬀering is always
equal whereas the purpose of the second oﬀering changes weekly. This might
lead to a habit formation where attendants are very used to giving a certain
amount to the ﬁrst oﬀering but are more open to circumstantial variables
in their decision what to contribute to the second oﬀering.
To analyze whether the treatment eﬀect is driven by the fact that an
oﬀering is internal or external, I estimated equation (1) separately for two
subsets of the data. The ﬁrst subset comprises the services that have a
second oﬀering with an internal purpose; the second subset comprises the
subset of services that have a second oﬀering with an external purpose.
Estimates are given in columns (5) and (6) of table 3, respectively. Interest-
ingly, the estimates show that the signiﬁcance of the treatment eﬀect for the
second oﬀering is persistent for the subset of external second oﬀerings, but
not for the subset with internal second oﬀerings. This gives some support to
the explanations that external purposes give greater possibilities to exhibit
unselﬁsh behavior or that anonymous bank payments are an excuse for low
contributions to internal oﬀerings. The third explanation however – that
the diﬀerence in eﬀect is caused by a habit formation eﬀect in contributing
to the ﬁrst oﬀering – is not sustained by these estimates.
Moreover, the eﬀect of using baskets for gathering the ﬁrst oﬀering has a
modest negative (not signiﬁcant) eﬀect on the average proceeds of the second
oﬀering for the subset of internal second oﬀerings. This makes sense: Both
oﬀerings serve the same purpose, which alleviates shifting contributions from
one oﬀering to the other.
With regard to the other explanatory variables it is interesting to note
that the “Chr. celebration” dummy and the “gratitude” dummy are only
signiﬁcant for the subset of internal oﬀerings. The reason for this may be
27that gratitude for the resurrection of Christ ﬁnds a natural expression in
contributing an extra amount to the own parish, but not in contributing to
e.g. Amnesty International. The “recommendation” dummy on the other
hand is much larger for the subset of external oﬀerings, lending support
to the hypothesis that making an appeal to the moral obligation of the
attendants has more eﬀect when the purpose is outside the own parish.
Finally, for the subset of internal oﬀerings, the group size eﬀect is greater
for the second oﬀerings, whereas no notable diﬀerence is observed for the
subset of external oﬀerings.
7 Eﬀect on type of coins contributed
As mentioned, for three parishes information is available on the number and
the type of coins that are collected. For two parishes this information is
available for ﬁrst as well as second oﬀerings and for the other only for the
ﬁrst oﬀerings. For the latter parish, the same information is available for the
pre-experimental period. Histograms and cumulative distribution functions
are given in ﬁgure 6.
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
The panels a, b and c all show the same pattern: as compared to closed
oﬀerings, collecting oﬀerings by means of baskets leads to a decrease in the
frequency of small coins (1, 2, 5, 10 and 20 eurocents) and an increase in the
frequency of large coins (1 and 2 euro).34 For parishes a and b,t h ec u m u l a -
tive distribution when using baskets ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the
cumulative distribution function for oﬀerings that use bags. For parish a,
also the frequencies for the time period before the outset of the experiment
are depicted.35 As compared to the pre-experimental period, a shift to
34A χ
2-test for diﬀerence in distributions delivers for parishes a, b and c p-values of
9.7 · 10
−8, 0.0559 and 0.0549 respectively.
35The pre-experimental period comprises the months January and February 2002; the
eﬀect of the experimental period may be confounded with the replacement of the Dutch
28giving larger coins occurred in the experimental period.36 The cumulative
distribution function of bag oﬀerings during the experimental period ﬁrst-
order stochastically dominates the cumulative distribution function of bag
oﬀerings in the pre-experimental period. In table 4, for each parish p-values
are given for the null hypothesis of equality of the fraction of 50 eurocent, 1
and 2 euro coins given in bag and basket oﬀerings.37 The joint-signiﬁcance
test shows that the increase in 1 and 2 euro coins is signiﬁcant at the 5%-
level.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Comparison of the coin distributions of bag oﬀerings with basket oﬀerings
shows that people refrain from giving small coins in favor of giving more
valuable ones. Feeling ashamed about giving substandard coins or trying to
receive social approval by ostentatiously giving large coins might be at least
part of the explanation. The fact that some kind of shift is also observed
when comparing bag-oﬀerings during the experimental period with bag-
oﬀerings in the pre-experimental period indicates that attendants are to
some extent aware that their decisions are observed by the university.38
The large eﬀect observed for parish a is remarkable, since it results from
observations on ﬁrst oﬀerings only. In light of the analysis in the previous
section this eﬀect is unexpected. Apparently, there is yet some role for social
incentives in the attendants’ decision to give to the ﬁrst oﬀering; these are
not incentives to give more, but to make the contribution look more. The
guilder by the euro in January 2002.
36p-value = 3.3 · 10
−4.
37For each type of coin and for each parish, the ratio of the number of coins of a
certain type relative to the total number of coins collected was calculated for each oﬀering
separately. These ratios were ordered (for parishes b and c a distinction was made for
ﬁrst and second oﬀerings) and signiﬁcance was tested using a Wilcoxon rank sum test.
The reported p-values for parishes b and c encompass both oﬀerings. Looking at ﬁrst and
second oﬀerings separately, the only signiﬁcant increase is found for the frequency of
￿2
coins collected in the second oﬀerings of parish b.
38One treasurer reported that some parishioners in his parish reacted to the research
project by saying: “For what reason does the university interfere in our aﬀairs?”
29results in this section form a contradiction to economic theory according to
which the particular distribution of coins should be irrelevant.
8C o n c l u s i o n
This paper set out to investigate whether removing anonymity aﬀects giving
in a real life environment that is still suﬃciently controllable to make ﬁndings
comparable to results of recent laboratory experiments. For a period of
29 weeks, the way in which oﬀerings were gathered in thirty churches was
determined by chance. Each oﬀering in this time period was equally likely
to be gathered by ordinary collection bags or by collection baskets. The
baskets enable local identiﬁcation of contributors, giving social incentives
like prestige, social approval, shame and social comparison the opportunity
to take eﬀect.
The main ﬁnding is that non-anonymous collecting methods have a
positive eﬀect on contributions to charity, whereas no eﬀect is found for
contributions to a public good. Moreover, the eﬀect of removing anonymity
peters out over time. The diﬀerence in eﬀect is distilled from the fact that
a division of services into two subsamples – based on whether the second
oﬀering serves an internal or an external purpose – shows that the eﬀect
of disclosure is persistent only for the subset of external oriented second
oﬀerings. One possible explanation for this diﬀerence is that external
purposes give more possibilities to exhibit unselﬁsh behavior. A second
explanation is provided by the fact that most churchgoers, besides giving
to the oﬀering, contribute to the parish by making regular bank payments.
Since these payments are unobservable to other parishioners, one can defend
low contributions to the oﬀerings by claiming that one compensates for this
by making large bank payments. The absence of an eﬀect for ﬁrst oﬀerings
is contrary to ﬁndings from similar public good experiments conducted in
the laboratory.
30Another interesting ﬁnding is that in both oﬀerings, people switch to
giving more valuable coins when anonymity is removed. This indicates that
social incentives do play some role in contributing to public goods. The
ﬁnding is in opposition to economic theory which asserts only the value of
an amount of money matters and not the particular set of coins of which it
is build up. Feeling ashamed about giving small coins or the desire for social
approval by giving larger coins might be a possible factor that drives this
shift in coins given.39 One has to note, however, that this result is based on
additional data from three churches only.
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33Table 1: Sample statistics independent variables
mean median st. dev. min. max.
1st oﬀering (834 obs.)
total payment (
￿) 82.698 73.185 61.683 8.120 791.960
per-attendant payment (
￿) 1.021 0.867 0.780 0.376 16.429
attendants 96.919 76.500 72.989 7.000 443.000
2nd oﬀering (791 obs.)
total payment (
￿) 71.450 59.300 59.229 5.110 878.310
per-attendant payment (
￿) 0.828 0.707 0.497 0.258 5.179
attendants 98.609 78.000 73.380 7.000 443.000
1st oﬀering 2nd oﬀering
gathering mode
bag 0.513 0.507
basket 0.487 0.480
plate 0.000 0.008
mug 0.000 0.005
LS open 0.008 0.018
LS closed 0.000 0.019
oﬀerings
is 2nd 0.948 1.000
is 3rd 0.193 0.204
is exit 0.131 0.113
mission exit 0.067 0.062
simultaneous 0.795 0.837
recommendation 0.054 0.094
relation 0.019 0.034
service
music 0.064 0.063
family service 0.024 0.023
special service 0.049 0.048
evening service 0.068 0.069
sun 40.132 39.736
Chr. celebration 0.064 0.063
own minister 0.474 0.472
coﬀee 0.470 0.455
purposes
parish 0.994 0.076
internal 0.001 0.295
federation 0.001 0.556
external 0.002 0.063
Eastern Europe 0.002 0.010
Lord’s Supper 0.008 0.037
gratitude 0.008 0.010
Notes: The per-attendant payment is calculated as
1
NT
N
i=1
T
t=1
yit,j
qit,j ,w i t hj =1 ,2;
t =1 ,2,...,T for the time period and i =1 ,2,...,N as an index for the churches.
The average value of the euro over the experimental period was about $ 0.94.
34Table 2: Per-attendant contributions at the church level
closed ﬁrst oﬀerings open ﬁrst oﬀerings diﬀerence
parish mean med. sd. min. max. # mean med. sd. min. max. # in mean
1 2.411 2.278 0.628 1.570 4.094 17 2.766 2.407 0.973 2.007 5.413 11 0.356
2 0.765 0.788 0.126 0.556 1.048 15 0.802 0.756 0.164 0.561 1.096 13 0.037
3 0.858 0.904 0.132 0.648 0.973 6 0.945 0.917 0.127 0.726 1.118 7 0.087
4 1.005 0.915 0.463 0.617 2.807 19 1.316 1.099 0.809 0.829 3.578 10 0.311
5 1.665 0.899 1.111 0.746 3.619 11 0.879 0.877 0.096 0.739 1.048 18 -0.786
6 1.004 1.017 0.070 0.879 1.142 13 1.155 1.141 0.243 0.741 1.578 15 0.151
7 0.836 0.833 0.157 0.593 1.119 16 0.790 0.809 0.057 0.693 0.867 13 -0.046
8 0.795 0.764 0.100 0.622 0.957 19 0.778 0.764 0.169 0.629 1.282 13 -0.017
9 0.934 0.895 0.172 0.623 1.302 12 0.964 0.938 0.113 0.805 1.198 14 0.030
10 1.171 1.207 0.208 0.809 1.494 14 1.168 1.154 0.143 0.925 1.409 15 -0.003
11 0.872 0.797 0.142 0.724 1.195 15 1.051 0.742 0.869 0.657 4.000 14 0.179
12 0.933 0.958 0.118 0.693 1.156 14 0.980 1.018 0.156 0.740 1.291 15 0.047
13 1.012 0.987 0.217 0.788 1.640 15 1.041 0.998 0.141 0.887 1.263 11 0.029
14 0.507 0.518 0.058 0.412 0.595 14 0.444 0.431 0.061 0.376 0.559 13 -0.063
15 0.636 0.633 0.084 0.500 0.785 12 0.653 0.663 0.118 0.440 0.947 15 0.017
16 0.666 0.661 0.138 0.430 0.965 14 0.713 0.717 0.146 0.478 0.914 14 0.047
17 0.719 0.699 0.151 0.513 1.091 16 0.663 0.698 0.103 0.422 0.798 12 -0.057
18 1.387 1.397 0.355 0.541 1.916 20 1.378 1.393 0.228 1.083 1.780 9 -0.009
19 1.038 1.007 0.137 0.843 1.347 12 0.998 0.999 0.106 0.822 1.255 17 -0.040
20 0.897 0.867 0.253 0.513 1.512 20 0.885 0.835 0.146 0.721 1.224 9 -0.012
21 1.468 1.398 0.243 1.260 2.135 13 1.494 1.524 0.293 1.129 2.155 11 0.026
22 0.806 0.802 0.123 0.659 1.072 13 0.949 0.950 0.158 0.688 1.307 14 0.144
23 0.737 0.725 0.120 0.598 1.017 14 0.783 0.662 0.338 0.538 1.821 13 0.046
24 0.511 0.509 0.067 0.438 0.691 15 0.513 0.506 0.077 0.388 0.646 14 0.002
25 0.625 0.640 0.096 0.382 0.766 14 0.651 0.621 0.111 0.500 0.875 12 0.025
26 0.927 0.807 0.628 0.502 3.055 14 0.805 0.840 0.147 0.507 1.020 14 -0.122
27 1.354 1.310 0.288 0.943 1.893 14 1.464 1.455 0.212 1.136 1.797 9 0.110
28 0.703 0.691 0.095 0.536 0.857 9 0.708 0.672 0.072 0.626 0.864 19 0.005
29 0.845 0.785 0.328 0.578 1.792 12 0.768 0.767 0.118 0.574 1.020 17 -0.077
30 1.111 1.025 0.261 0.914 1.925 15 1.077 0.939 0.519 0.430 2.598 13 -0.034
mean 0.973 0.924 427 0.986 0.943 394 0.013
35Table 2: (continued)
closed second oﬀerings open second oﬀerings diﬀerence
parish mean med. sd. min. max. # mean med. sd. min. max. # in mean
1 —————0 —————0
2 0.642 0.644 0.086 0.449 0.803 12 0.688 0.670 0.090 0.522 0.874 17 0.046
3 0.911 0.721 0.682 0.472 2.836 10 0.910 0.923 0.037 0.868 0.940 3 -0.001
4 0.891 0.904 0.187 0.594 1.178 14 0.895 0.863 0.283 0.531 1.814 15 0.004
5 0.994 0.754 0.691 0.562 3.289 14 0.820 0.783 0.132 0.643 1.139 15 -0.174
6 0.733 0.740 0.059 0.656 0.850 12 0.804 0.831 0.117 0.601 0.965 16 0.071
7 0.778 0.722 0.199 0.542 1.327 13 0.725 0.701 0.099 0.597 0.906 15 -0.053
8 0.630 0.635 0.099 0.465 0.784 17 0.786 0.688 0.448 0.550 2.194 12 0.156
9 0.823 0.781 0.165 0.589 1.228 15 0.861 0.874 0.121 0.611 1.054 11 0.038
10 0.981 0.968 0.159 0.611 1.194 12 1.133 1.066 0.261 0.788 1.717 16 0.152
11 0.684 0.647 0.156 0.360 1.032 18 0.654 0.574 0.187 0.531 1.170 11 -0.030
12 0.881 0.856 0.181 0.578 1.306 12 0.853 0.836 0.147 0.645 1.100 10 -0.029
13 0.792 0.795 0.097 0.595 0.963 18 0.926 0.842 0.209 0.750 1.302 8 0.134
14 0.512 0.416 0.299 0.258 1.335 11 0.402 0.410 0.085 0.266 0.542 16 -0.109
15 0.514 0.501 0.117 0.362 0.799 10 0.547 0.560 0.068 0.451 0.669 17 0.033
16 0.501 0.477 0.106 0.360 0.804 17 0.630 0.583 0.117 0.525 0.891 10 0.129
17 0.808 0.639 0.560 0.430 2.379 10 0.717 0.707 0.090 0.593 0.893 15 -0.091
18 1.221 1.184 0.444 0.341 2.048 11 1.735 1.667 0.649 1.157 3.405 10 0.513
19 0.833 0.759 0.231 0.633 1.438 16 0.802 0.811 0.112 0.612 1.034 12 -0.031
20 0.700 0.661 0.121 0.572 1.091 17 0.936 0.921 0.303 0.625 1.631 11 0.237
21 1.081 1.011 0.192 0.929 1.434 6 1.191 1.128 0.168 1.049 1.509 6 0.110
22 0.825 0.783 0.135 0.640 1.073 14 0.881 0.900 0.132 0.659 1.167 13 0.057
23 0.701 0.613 0.402 0.428 1.868 11 0.789 0.702 0.252 0.557 1.390 14 0.088
24 0.421 0.424 0.044 0.350 0.516 14 0.446 0.447 0.045 0.386 0.536 15 0.025
25 0.461 0.444 0.088 0.361 0.646 13 0.566 0.573 0.073 0.442 0.683 15 0.106
26 0.741 0.646 0.377 0.481 1.951 13 0.632 0.635 0.124 0.452 0.908 15 -0.109
27 1.218 1.171 0.311 0.962 2.247 15 1.128 1.212 0.214 0.697 1.258 6 -0.090
28 0.624 0.628 0.091 0.466 0.804 12 0.628 0.607 0.111 0.483 0.951 15 0.004
29 0.734 0.651 0.314 0.485 1.525 14 0.687 0.672 0.129 0.484 0.935 15 -0.047
30 0.598 0.580 0.143 0.412 0.920 14 0.666 0.675 0.084 0.539 0.860 13 0.068
mean 0.767 0.716 385 0.808 0.788 367 0.042
Gratitude oﬀerings and oﬀerings held during or directly after celebration of the Lord’s
Supper are excluded.
36Table 3: Estimation results (standard errors within parentheses).
OLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
internal external
2
nd oﬀering 2
nd oﬀering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
basket 1
st (β1) 0.007 0.003 -0.006 0.028 0.020 0.007
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.023) (0.034) (0.031)
basket 2
nd (β2) 0.061** 0.041* 0.038* 0.096** 0.043 0.080*
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.028) (0.043) (0.036)
basket 1
st on -0.009 -0.022 -0.008 -0.032 0.019
2
nd oﬀ. (β3) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.021)
change in eﬀect basket 1
st
week 7-12 (φ1,1) -0.047 0.012 -0.064
(0.032) (0.046) (0.043)
week 13-18 (φ1,2) -0.054
† -0.068 -0.036
(0.031) (0.045) (0.041)
week 19-24 (φ1,3) -0.051 -0.041 -0.026
(0.034) (0.051) (0.044)
week 25-30 (φ1,4) -0.018 0.016 -0.002
(0.033) (0.050) (0.042)
change in eﬀect basket 2
nd
week 7-12 (φ2,1) -0.050 -0.026 -0.009
(0.036) (0.050) (0.047)
week 13-18 (φ2,2) -0.050 -0.027 -0.046
(0.037) (0.054) (0.047)
week 19-24 (φ2,3) -0.137** -0.113
† -0.145**
(0.041) (0.059) (0.053)
week 25-30 (φ2,4) -0.075
† 0.035 -0.091
†
(0.039) (0.057) (0.049)
general time eﬀect
week 7-12 (ζ1) -0.011 -0.024 -0.002 -0.038 0.012
(0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.033) (0.028)
week 13-18 (ζ2) 0.004 0.007 0.032 0.081* 0.006
(0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.034) (0.028)
week 19-24 (ζ3) -0.019 -0.017 0.022 0.047 0.003
(0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.038) (0.031)
week 25-30 (ζ4) 0.028 0.026 0.044
† 0.037 0.031
(0.021) (0.019) (0.024) (0.038) (0.030)
37Table 3: (continued)
OLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
internal external
2
nd oﬀering 2
nd oﬀering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
service speciﬁc variables
is 3rd -0.074** -0.069** -0.071** -0.035 -0.081**
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.019)
is exit -0.015 -0.029 -0.032 -0.057 -0.020
(0.044) (0.039) (0.039) (0.080) (0.050)
mission exit -0.015 0.035 0.041 0.077
(0.074) (0.087) (0.087) (0.137)
simultaneous -0.043 0.007 0.009 0.016 -0.018
(0.031) (0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.045)
music 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.019 -0.002
(0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.037)
coﬀee -0.011 -0.005 -0.005 0.005 -0.016
(0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.018)
family -0.054 -0.075* -0.076* -0.092 -0.072
(0.042) (0.037) (0.037) (0.062) (0.048)
special service 0.005 -0.009 -0.010 0.008 -0.015
(0.030) (0.023) (0.023) (0.041) (0.028)
sun 0.000 -0.005 -0.006 -0.033 0.001
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.027) (0.020)
lnq -0.181**
(0.027)
1st oﬀering speciﬁc variables
lnq (δ1) -0.277** -0.271** -0.268** -0.177** -0.317**
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.054) (0.045)
recommendation 0.003 -0.021 -0.017 -0.011 -0.017
(0.061) (0.049) (0.049) (0.066) (0.068)
relation 0.018 -0.020 -0.019 -0.111
† 0.053
(0.059) (0.047) (0.047) (0.067) (0.063)
own minister 0.015 0.022 0.024 -0.014 0.042*
(0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.020)
gratitude 1.123** 1.142** 1.163** 1.193**
(0.203) (0.180) (0.180) (0.257)
Chr. cel 0.082* 0.086** 0.084** 0.087* 0.032
(0.035) (0.029) (0.029) (0.036) (0.048)
evening service -0.008 0.006 0.001 -0.009 0.025
(0.044) (0.029) (0.029) (0.046) (0.040)
38Table 3: (continued)
OLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS
internal external
2
nd oﬀering 2
nd oﬀering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2nd oﬀering speciﬁc variables
lnq (δ2) -0.249** -0.299** -0.312** -0.374** -0.281**
(0.037) (0.041) (0.042) (0.063) (0.054)
own minister -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 0.002 -0.003
(0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.026)
federation -0.062** -0.093* -0.039* -0.037
†
(0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019)
external 0.040 0.118** 0.074* 0.081* 0.083*
(0.035) (0.040) (0.034) (0.034) (0.039)
Eastern Europe 0.228** 0.415** 0.367** 0.372** 0.360**
(0.080) (0.118) (0.100) (0.100) (0.109)
Lord’s Supper 0.214** 0.098 0.102 0.114 -0.037
(0.051) (0.068) (0.068) (0.121) (0.098)
recommendation 0.161* 0.238** 0.244** 0.067 0.350**
(0.067) (0.056) (0.056) (0.077) (0.079)
relation 0.182* 0.267** 0.265** 0.293** 0.202*
(0.074) (0.062) (0.062) (0.087) (0.084)
gratitude 0.567** 0.604** 0.611** 0.738** 0.088
(0.088) (0.073) (0.073) (0.079) (0.230)
Chr. cel 0.208** 0.152** 0.145** 0.257** 0.088
(0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.051) (0.057)
evening service 0.089
† 0.117** 0.102** 0.091 0.084
†
(0.047) (0.036) (0.037) (0.056) (0.047)
overall eﬀect baskets 0.059 0.044 0.016 0.116 0.031 0.106
[p-values] [0.057] [0.030] [0.743] [0.014] [0.660] [0.085]
diﬀerence in eﬀect 0.054 0.038 0.038 0.068 0.023 0.073
[p-values] [0.011] [0.084] [0.025] [0.047] [0.650] [0.098]
Prob F-test
time eﬀect 1
st oﬀ. — — — 0.364 0.379 0.563
time eﬀect 2
nd oﬀ. — — — 0.018 0.155 0.038
Sample size 1582 1582 1582 1582 586 996
Notes:
† Signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level;
∗ Signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level;
∗∗
Signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level.
Empty cells in columns (5) and (6) mean that there is no variation in the dummy variable
in the subsample considered or that the variable is the default value (as “federation” is in
column (6).
39Table 4: Diﬀerence in fraction of coins given (p-values).
type of coin
parish
￿0.50
￿1
￿2
(a) 0.1413 0.0282* 0.0186*
(b) 0.8790 0.0312* 0.0002**
(c) 0.0836† 0.4687 0.0093**
joint test 0.2400 0.0291* 0.0001**
Note:
† Signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level;
∗ Signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level;
∗∗ Signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level
Parish a: ﬁrst oﬀerings only; b, c:ﬁ r s t
and second oﬀerings combined.
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Figure 3: Average payment to the ﬁrst and second oﬀering over the weeks
of the experiment (Gratitude oﬀerings and oﬀering during or directly after
celebration of the Lord’s Supper are excluded).
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Figure 4: Wilcoxon rank sum test (z-values).
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Figure 5: Diﬀerence in mean test (t-values).
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Figure 6: Frequency distributions and cumulative coin distributions for three
parishes. Parish a: ﬁrst oﬀerings only; b, c: ﬁrst and second oﬀerings
combined.
42Table A.1: Deﬁnition of explanatory dummy variables
gathering mode
bag =1 if the oﬀering is gathered by means of bags, 0 otherwise;
basket =1 if the oﬀering is gathered by means of baskets, 0 otherwise;
plate =1 if the oﬀering is gathered by means of plates, 0 otherwise;
mug =1 if the oﬀering is gathered by means of mugs, 0 otherwise;
LS open =1 if the Lord’s supper oﬀering is gathered by means of baskets
or plates, 0 otherwise;
LS closed =1 if the oﬀering is gathered by means of bags or mugs, 0 otherwise;
gratitude =1 if the oﬀering is a so-called gratitude oﬀering, 0 otherwise;
oﬀerings
is 2nd = 1 if a second oﬀering takes place during service, 0 otherwise;
is 3rd = 1 if a third oﬀering takes place during service, 0 otherwise;
is exit = 1 if a exit oﬀering takes place after service, 0 otherwise;
mission exit = 1 if the exit oﬀering is meant for missionary work, 0 otherwise;
simultaneous = 1 if the second oﬀering directly follows the
ﬁrst oﬀering, 0 otherwise;
recommendation = 1 if the oﬀering has received a special recommendation
in advance, 0 otherwise;
relation = 1 if the purpose of the oﬀering bears a relationship with
the theme of the service, 0 otherwise;
service
music = 1 if there are additional musicians during service, 0 otherwise;
family service = 1 if the service has special attention for children
or youth, 0 otherwise;
special service = 1 if the service has a special character, 0 otherwise;
evening service = 1 if an additional evening service is held at the same day, 0 otherwise;
sun = daily hours of sunshine as a percentage of the maximum amount;
Chr. celebration = 1 if the service takes place at Easter or Pentecost, 0 otherwise;
own minister = 1 if the service is led by the own minister, 0 otherwise;
coﬀee = 1 if there is opportunity to drink coﬀee (for free)
after service, 0 otherwise;
purposes
parish = 1 if the purpose of the oﬀering is the parish in general,
0o t h e r w i s e ;
internal = 1 if the purpose of the oﬀering is a speciﬁc cause within the
own parish, 0 otherwise;
federation = 1 if the purpose of the oﬀering is the National
Baptist Federation, 0 otherwise;
external = 1 if the purpose of the oﬀering is a cause outside the own
parish, 0 otherwise;
Eastern Europe = 1 if the purpose of the oﬀering is a cause in Eastern Europe,
0o t h e r w i s e .
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